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ACCOMMODATION AND EQUAL LIBERTY
LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN*
How should legislatures respond to requests from religious
individuals or institutions for exemptions to generally applicable
laws? In Employment Division v. Smith,1 the Supreme Court held
that the Free Exercise Clause does not require legislatures (federal
or state) to honor such requests.' The question remains whether
they should do so on a voluntary basis. This is the problem of
permissive accommodation-that is, accommodation of religious
liberty as a matter of political discretion rather than constitutional
compulsion. Put in the terms of this Symposium, it is the problem
of accommodation in the public square.
It is not immediately apparent why permissive accommodation
presents any problem at all. Because permissive accommodation
is not mandatory, it does not raise the knotty issue of determining
when legislatures must grant exemptions requests. Legislatures
always may deny requests for permissive accommodation, but
when they do grant such requests, they further a fundamental
constitutional commitment to religious liberty by minimizing
governmental interference with religious exercise. Why not simply
encourage legislatures to grant requests for permissive accommo-
dation to the greatest extent possible?
The problem occurs when legislatures protect religious liberty in
a manner that compromises another fundamental constitutional
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. I would like to thank
Michael Bressman, Rebecca Brown, John Goldberg, Pam Harris, Chip Lupu, Larry Sager,
and Eugene Volokh for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts. I also would like to
thank the participants at the William and Mary Institute of Bill of Rights Law Symposium
on Religion in the Public Square for their generous comments on remarks that formed the
basis for this Essay. Finally, I would like to thank Charles Sipos for his excellent research
assistance.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. See id. at 888-90 (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require exemptions
to generally applicable state drug laws formembers of the Native American Church to smoke
peyote in observance of their religion).
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commitment-equality. If left to their own devices, legislatures
might well grant exemptions for religious claimants while denying
comparable treatment to nonreligious claimants. They might even
grant an exemption to one religious sect while denying comparable
treatment to other sects. In either case, the legislatures implicate
themselves in the unconstitutional establishment of religion.
The most straightforward and compelling example of this
phenomenon concerns the exemption for conscientious objectors to
the federal military draft statute. Congress enacted the federal
military draft statute decades ago with an exemption for those
individuals who object to war based on their "religious training
and belief."3 It would have been an intolerable violation of the
principle of equal treatment between religion and nonreligion for
Congress to deny an exemption to those with nonreligious but
deeply held moral or ethical objections to war. Those individuals,
no less than their religious counterparts, confronted the gravest
prospect of killing or being killed in contravention of their funda-
mental values. The Supreme Court avoided a violation of equal
treatment by construing the essentially religious exemption to
encompass individuals who object to war based on a "sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for
the exemption."4 In other words, the Court read the exemption to
include those who object to war as a result of deeply held religious,
moral, or ethical beliefs.'
Some legislatures have carried forward the lessons of the draft
cases by writing "conscientious objector" provisions broadly in other
laws. For example, several states have proposed or enacted
3. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 456Q)(1958). The statute
defined "religious training and belief" as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Beinginvolving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including]
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." Id.
The practice of exempting religious objectors from the draft was long-standing. See United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 169-70 (1965).
4. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
5. See, e.g., Welshv. United States, 398 U.S. 333,339-40 (1970) ("What is necessary under
Seeger for a registrant's conscientious objection to all warto be 'religious' within the meaning
of § 6 (j) is that this opposition to war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of
traditional religious convictions.").
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exemptions from the requirement of dissecting animals as part of
the public elementary and high school science curriculum for
students who oppose dissection on any grounds.6 Like the
conscientious objector exemption to the draft, these exemptions
have religious roots.7 Yet they cover students who resist dissection
for both religious and nonreligious reasons. They apply to students
who believe in the sanctity of all God's creatures as well as
members of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)
and other "dyed-in-the-wool animal lover[s]."'
But many legislatures fail to think broadly when they undertake
to accommodate religious conscience. Consider some recent
amendments to the federal Medicare and Medicaid Acts. These
amendments do not represent typical accommodations because they
lift a condition on the receipt of government benefits that conflicts
with religious exercise rather than a government requirement or
restriction that conflicts with religious exercise-for example, the
draft or dissection requirements. Yet the same legal analysis
applies. When legislatures voluntarily lift conditions on benefits
that impede religion, they must abide by the same principle of equal
treatment that guides them when they voluntarily lift restrictions
or requirements that impede religion.9
6. See, e.g., CAL. [EDuC.] CODE § 32255.1(a) (West 1994) (allowing an exemption to
dissection requirements for "any pupil with a moral objection to dissecting or otherwise
harming or destroying animals, or any parts thereof); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 233.0674(2Xa)
(West 1998) (permitting students to be excused from dissection upon written request of a
parent or guardian); 2000 Ill. Legis. Serv. 91-771 (West) (encouraging public and private
elementary and high schools to "excuse a student enrolled in a course in which students are
ordinarily expected to perform, participate in, or observe dissection who objects for any
reason to performing, participating in, or observing that dissection and instead allow the
student to complete an alternative project!) (emphasis added); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-
1523(a) (West 2000) (allowing"[p]ublic ornonpublic school pupils from kindergarten through
grade twelve" to "refuse to dissect" animals); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-22-20(a) (1999) (permitting
a "parent(s) or legal guardian of any student in a public or nonpublic primary or secondary
school [to] refuse to allow their child to dissect" any animal).
7. See generally Stephanie Banchero, Dissection Debate Cuts at Curriculum, CE!. TRI.,
Mar. 9, 2000, at 1, available in 2000 WL 3643932 (quoting Illinois State Representative
Lauren Beth Gash, a co-sponsor of the Illinois Bill granting an exemption to dissection, as
stating "[slome students have religious and moral problems with dissection").
8. Id.
9. This is not to deny the differences between "benefit" exemptions and traditional
"burden" exemptions. Burden exemptions may present a stronger case for religious
accommodation because they seek to ensure noninterference with religion rather than
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The Medicare and Medicaid Acts provide reimbursement to poor
and elderly patients for medical treatment they receive in a hospital
or skilled nursing facility along with related nonmedical nursing
care, such as bed pans and sponge baths.10 When Congress enacted
the Medicare and Medicaid Acts in 1965, it provided special
exemptions for the Christian Scientists, who oppose medical
treatment on religious grounds and object to paying into a system
for which they could receive no benefit.1 Congress allowed the
Christian Scientists to receive reimbursement for the nonmedical
nursing care normally incidental to medical treatment when
received in connection with faith healing at a Christian Science
sanatorium. 2 Thus, Congress effectively waived for the Christian
distribution of monetary grants. See infra text accompanying note 24. Governmental
noninterference is critically important to religious claimants and close to the core of the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. But see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (sustaining Free Exercise challenge to condition on state unemployment benefits
requiring plaintiff to accept work on Saturday in violation of her religion). For similar
reasons, noninterference also may present a stronger case for equal treatment. Noninter-
ference with respect to comparable nonreligious claimants is essential because of the
governmental imposition on those claimants and the resulting effect on Establishment
Clause values of any relief designed exclusively for religion. Admittedly, these differences
tend to diminish the rhetorical force of the Medicare and Medicaid example (though not the
legal principles applicable to it). Nonetheless, that example deserves attention because it is
an actual accommodation recently considered by Congress and litigated in the courts.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(d) (1965) (defining the scope of benefits.)
11. See, e.g., Health Services for the Aged Under the Social Security Insurance System:
Hearings on H.R. 4222 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong. 728-29
(1961) (statement of Dr. J. Buroughs Stokes, Christian Science Comm. on Publication)
(advocating an exemption for Christian Scientists).
Christan Science relies wholly on spiritial means for healing, as did Christ
Jesus .... It respects the right of each individual to choose that mode of health
care which seems to him most efficacious and most nearly in accord with God's
will .... [When in need of hospital care, a Christian Scientist goes to a
Christian Science sanatorium rather than a medical hospital.
... We respectfully request that, should you decide to report favorably H.R.
4222, definite provision be made for those contributors who rely on prayer or
spiritual means alone for healing.... In this and for these contributors, we ask
that you consider the posibility of providing for an exemption from that portion
of the social security and railroad retirement taxes which would be allotted to
pay for such insurance.
Id.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) ("The term 'hospital' also includes a Christian Science
sanatorium operated, or listed and certified, by the First Church of Christ, Scientist"); see
also id § 1395c (1982) (providing "basic protection against the costs of hospital, related post-
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Scientists the medical treatment requirement applicable to all other
patients. In 1996, a district court invalidated the Christian Science
exemptions as a violation of the Establishment Clause." The court
held that the provisions could not survive the strict scrutiny test
applicable to sect-specific provisions even if those provisions were
intended to accommodate religion.1' The court reasoned that, what-
ever the limits of permissive accommodation, such accommodation
cannot discriminate among religious sects by expressly singling out
one for favorable treatment. 15
With uncharacteristic speed, Congress rewrote the provisions to
eliminate the sect-specific references. It permitted any patient to
receive reimbursement for nonmedical nursing care if that patient
objects to medical treatment for religious reasons and receives such
nonmedical care in a facility that also objects to medical treatment
for religious reasons." A district court upheld the reworded
exemptions against an Establishment Clause challenge, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed.'7 Thp courts found that the provisions
constitute permissive accommodation of religion because they
relieve affected individuals of the choice between following their
religious beliefs and receiving public health care benefits. 8
hospital, home health services, and hospice care") (emphasis added). The Act also exempted
Christian Science sanatoria from certain medical oversight provisions applicable to nursing
homes and skilled nursing facilities. See iL § 1396a(a) (1973) ("[T]he terms 'skilled nursing
facility' and 'nursing home' do not include a Christian Science sanatorium operated, or listed
and certified, by the First Church of Christ, Scientist, Boston, Massachusetts.-).
13. See Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Vladeck, 938 F. Supp. 1466 (D.
Minn. 1996).
14. See id. at 1485.
15. See id.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(ssXl) (1997) (authorizing reimbursement for nonmedical
nursing services to any individual who receives such services at a "religious nonmedical
health care institution," which is defined as an institution that "provides only nonmedical
nursing items and services exclusively to patients who choose to rely solely upon a religious
method of healing and for whom the acceptance of medical health services would be
inconsistent with their religious beliefs," and that "on the basis of its religious beliefs, does
not provide... medical items and services ... for its patients"), The provisions also exempt
"religious nonmedical health care institutions" from certain medical oversight requirements
.applicable to hospitals and skilled nursing facilities. See id. § 1320c-11.
17. See Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. y. Min De Pare, 212 F.3d 1084 (8th
Cir. 2000).
18. See id at 1093-94 ("By extending nonmedical health care benefits to individuals who
object for reasons ofreligion to medical treatment, section 4454 spares such individuals from
beingforced to choose between adhering to the tenets oftheir faith and receiving government
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The problem with the Medicare and Medicaid exemptions is not
that Congress wished to accommodate the Christian Scientists or
religious objectors to medical treatment. Indeed, one might think
it entirely appropriate for Congress to recognize and respond to
the dilemma encountered by religious individuals like the Christian
Scientists. Rather, the problem is that Congress failed simulta-
neously to consider the similar interests of nonreligious individuals.
Initially, Congress also failed to consider the interests of other
religious individuals. The district court condemned this defect, and
Congress quickly repaired it. But just as it is possible to imagine
individuals other than Christian Scientists who have religious
objections to medical care, it also is possible to imagine individuals
who have moral or ethical objections to medical care. Members of
PETA might object to certain medical procedures or medications
because they depend on extensive animal research and testing.
These PETA members may seem less sympathetic than their
student counterparts in the dissection example because their
animal-rights-based objection to medical treatment seems less
plausible than a similar objection to cutting up animals. They
certainly seem less sympathetic than their nonreligious counter-
parts in the draft example because they seek to avoid denial of
a relatively small monetary benefit rather than forced military
service. Regardless, these PETA members face exactly the same
dilemma that Congress sought to alleviate for their religious
counterparts in this example-to accept medical treatment in order
to qualify for the nonmedical nursing care benefit. Such differential
treatment violates the principle of equality between religion and
nonreligion.'9
aid, and in doing so removes a burden that the law would otherwise impose."). The dissent
argued, among other things, that denial of benefits does not"burden" religion as required by
traditional accommodation analysis. See id. at 1105 (Lay, J., dissenting). Otherwise, denial
of a publicly funded education might be said to "burden" the religion of those who choose to
attend parochial school for religious reasons and might support a legislative accommodation
financing the secular aspects of a religious education. See id. at 1106.
19. The courts rejected the argument that such an accommodation violates the principle
of equal treatment between religion and nonreligion. They determined that religious patients
do not receive a greater benefit than nonreligious patients. See id. at 1096-98. In fact, the
courts found that religious patients actually receive the smaller benefit because they receive
only a "subset" of the benefits that nonreligious patients receive in connection with medical
treatment. See id. at 1097. This analysis suffers from a logical error. It fails to understand
[Vol. 42:10071012
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Equality violations may occur not only with respect to exemptions
for individual conscience but with respect to exemptions for
religious institutions or religious conduct. Suppose a state provides
an exemption from its restrictive zoning laws for religious
institutions that want to expand their facilities, but denies an
exemption to comparable nonreligious institutions, such as
nonprofit or community service-oriented institutions.0 Suppose a
state provides an exemption, as many do, from its drug laws for
individuals to ingest peyote as part of a religious worship service,2 '
but denies an exemption for nonreligious individuals to smoke
peyote for equally weighty purposes, such as medical purposes.
As these examples demonstrate, the problem of permissive
accommodation tracks a larger problem in the law: how to respond
when efforts to promote one important constitutional value
(religious liberty) interfere with another (equality).2 One sensible
answer is to devise a way to preserve both values to the maximum
extent possible. Yet, as the Medicare and Medicaid example
demonstrates, we cannot depend upon legislatures and courts to
take this approach. Nor have many commentators advocated it,
preferring instead simply to elevate religious liberty above
equality.' 3 Although some commentators have attempted to harmo-
nize religious liberty and equality, even they have found themselves
thatnonreligious patients seek access to that important subset ofbenefits on the same stand-
alone basis as religious patients. See id. at 1107-08.
20. Cf. Religious LandUse and InstitutionalizedPersonsActof2000, S. 2869,106th Cong.
(2000) (requiring state and federal governments to demonstrate a compellinginterest before
imposing land use restrictions in a manner that substantially burdens religious institutions
and assemblies).
21. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,890 ("It is therefore not surprising that
a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use.").
22. It is possible to view the problem in non-dichotomous terms as a failure to recognize
that religious liberty reflects one instance of a more general constitutional commitment to
prioritize certain values above generally applicable norms. On this understanding, claims of
religious liberty are entitled to constitutional solicitude but no more so than analogous claims
of nonreligious liberty. Thus, the problem ofpermissive accommodation is not the disregard
of equality in favor of religious liberty, but the failure to recognize that equality is an
inherent part of religious liberty (andvice versa). Despite the appeal of this characterization,
I choose to frame the problem as a competition between religious liberty and equality
because this is the way that legislatures, courts, and commentators most often see and
describe it.
23. See, e.g., MichaelW. McConnell,Accommodation ofReligion:An Update andResponse
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 685 (1992).
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taking sides, generally discouraging legislatures from voluntarily
accommodating religious liberty in order to safeguard equality.'
Moreover, these commentators have fallen short of articulating an
approach that addresses the precise issue of how legislatures may
respond to religious exemption requests. After Smith, and to a large
extent even before Smith was decided, discretionary legislative
accommodation offers the most promising avenue for the protection
of religious liberty.25 For this reason, or for more self-interested
political motives, legislators frequently want to grant religious
accommodation requests. The issue is whether there is an approach
that integrates this irrepressible and typically laudable legislative
desire with equality theory.
In this Essay, I propose an approach that enables legislatures
to respond affirmatively to religious requests for accommodation
while maintaining equal treatment. In its most basic form, the
approach permits legislatures to respond to religious requests for
accommodation on a permissive basis as long as they are prepared
to extend any such accommodation to similarly situated non-
religious claimants. Put differently, legislatures may undertake to
protect religious liberty if at the same time they demonstrate a
willingness to provide a measure of equal liberty.
The real work comes in determining the meaning of equal liberty,
given the inherent indeterminacy of that concept. Many things
are alike and unlike in different respects. The relevant compari-
son requires an underlying substantive theory of equality.26 For
24. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. RFV.
1245 (1994); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991) [hereinafter Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause]; Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation,
60 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 743 (1992) [hereinafter Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation].
25. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 24, at 1304 (arguingthat legislatures maybe better
than courts at accommodating religious interests because they "have discretion to enhance
the value they place upon accommodating fundamental personal commitments, including
religious commitments"). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of Free Exercise
claims before Smith, see John T. Noonan, Jr., The End of Free Exercise?, 42 DEPAULL. REV.
567(1992).
26. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARM. L. REV. 537,548-56
(1982) (arguing that the concept of equality requires reference to underlying substantive
judgments for determining relevant differences and similarities); see also Steven D. Smith,
Blooming Confusion: Madison's Mixed Legacy, 75 IND. L.J. 61, 63-64 (2000) (discussing
1014 [Vol. 42:1007
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permissive accommodation, the relevant comparison requires
confronting some of the hardest questions in constitutional law:
what constitutes religion and which secular values deserve com-
parable protection? There are a variety of possible answers, all
contested and contestable. The difficulty is how to proceed in the
absence of consensus on the underlying substantive theory of equal
liberty.
Part I of this Essay defends the use of equality analysis in
relation to permissive accommodation and describes the dominant
equality-based approaches to the issue. Part II proposes the equal
liberty approach and discusses the difficulty presented by its
application. Part HI identifies several objections to the approach.
Part IV briefly considers the application of the approach to
accommodations awarded not by legislatures but by administrative
agencies.
I. ACCOMMODATION AND EQUALITY
Almost all agree that the Establishment Clause generally
contains some principle of equal treatment (or "neutrality" or
"nondiscrimination") between religion and nonreligion. But many
disagree that the principle of equal treatment applies in its most
basic, formal sense to permissive accommodation. There is common
sense appeal to this position. It is not obvious why a principle
designed to prevent governmental advancement or endorsement of
religion should prohibit governmental noninterference with religion.
Far from lending governmental support to religion, accommodation
achieves distance from religion and merely facilitates preexisting
religious choices.
The Supreme Court reflected this view in a leading permissive
accommodation case, Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos:
"This Court has long recognized that the government may (and
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it
may do so without violating the Establishment Clause." It is
well established, too, that "[t]he limits of permissible state
Professor Westen's observation in the context of the religious equality principle).
2001] 1015
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accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with
the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."
There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for
"benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to
exist without sponsorship and without interference."
Where ... government acts with the proper purpose of lifbing a
regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no
reason to require that the exemption come packaged with
benefits to secular entities.
Michael McConnell makes a similar argument. Professor
McConnell emphasizes the role of the Establishment Clause,
together with the Free Exercise Clause, in minimizing govern-
mental interference with religion.' He questions why a clause
primarily intended to protect religion from governmental inter-
ference should require equal protection of nonreligion.29 Because
permissive accommodation achieves the central function of the
Establishment Clause-that is, minimizing governmental interfer-
ence with religion-it is valid without consideration of comparable
secular values.3"
In my view, this argument too easily dismisses the equal
treatment principle contained in the Establishment Clause and its
application to permissive accommodation."1 I understand the
Establishment Clause to prohibit the government from preferring
religion to nonreligion for two basic reasons: to protect against
government preference among religions and to recognize the
importance of both religious and nonreligious values in a modern,
pluralistic society. Both of these reasons apply to permissive
27.483 U.S. 327,334,338 (1987) (citations omitted) (upholding an exemption for religious
organizations from Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination in employment).
28. See McConnell, supra note 23, at 688-90.
29. See id. at 689-90.
30. See id. at 692-93.
31. Many have criticized the pro-accommodation position articulated by McConnell. See,
e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 24, at 1254-56; Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment
Clause, supra note 24, at 567; William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom RestorationAct:
Establishment, Equal Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REV. 227,237-42
(1995); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 136-50.
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accommodation, and they apply no differently than they do to other
acts of political discretion that concern religion.
It often is said that religious liberty requires the government
to remain evenhanded on all religious matters in the political
process." Such evenhandedness prevents religious sects from
competing bitterly with each other for political dominance."3 It also
prevents the government from controlling the terms on which
religious individuals or religious institutions must be religious in
order to qualify for valuable benefits-even when those benefits
take the form of exemptions from generally applicable laws.3" In
addition, it prohibits the government from using politics subtly to
coerce nonbelievers and nonpractitioners to profess religion in order
to qualify for valuable benefits or exemptions.
Evenhandedness not only prevents the government from pre-
ferring one religion to another but also from preferring generally
religion to nonreligion. Whatever the Establishment Clause meant
at the founding, it can no longer tolerate discrimination against
nonreligious belief structures in the award of permissive accom-
modations, if for no other reason than that the distinction between
religious and nonreligious conscience has become increasingly
murky. 5 As the Supreme Court noted some years ago, nonreligious
conscience often occupies the same place in the life of the believer
32. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 313,
313-14 (1996) ("IThe core point of religious liberty is that the government does not take
positions on religious questions-not in its daily administration, not in its laws, and not in
its Constitution either."); Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and the Constitution, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 407,420-21 (1996) ("[T]here is simply nopractical need for political
bureaucracies, even democratic political bureaucracies, to have the power to discriminate in
favor ofreligion."); see also Smith, supra note 26, at 62-63 (crediting James Madison with the
notion that government must be neutral in all matters of religion).
33. See Laycock, supra note 32, at 317 (discussing history of conflict among religions for
political dominance); William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 DEPAUL L.
REv. 243, 247 (1994) ("Removing the government from religious issues and removing
religious issues from the government have been posited as necessary to avoid conflicts
between religious groups and between church and state.").
34. See Laycock, supra note 32, at 347 ("Exemptions are also consistent with substantive
neutrality so long as they do not encourage religious belief or practice.... Claims for
exemptions that align with self-interest are problematic because they create incentives to
join the exempted faith, and in practice such claims have not been recognized.").
35. It also can be argued that the later-enacted Fourteenth Amendment altered the
meaning ofthe Establishment Clause, requiring equalprotection ofreligion and nonreligion.
See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying
Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049,1123-24 (1996).
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as religious conscience.36 In William Marshall's words, "religion and
nonreligion simply present two alternative modes of ideology.""
Similarly, nonreligious associations frequently serve the same
social or civic functions as religious associations. As Ira Lupu has
observed, nonreligious associations "may help individuals make the
world smaller and more coherent, teach and help to preserve the
continuity of values, proselytize, develop and maintain ritual,
promote good or evil, provide support in times of trouble or sorrow,
and facilitate commercial transactions among members who know
and trust one another." s Because religion and nonreligion present
alternative belief systems or modes of affiliation, they must receive
comparable consideration in the political process. 9 Any permissive
accommodation that departs from this principle by singling out
religion for special treatment violates the Establishment Clause.
Although this approach to permissive accommodation diverges
from Establishment Clause law as reflected in cases like Amos and
Smith," it finds general support in equal protection and free speech
36. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
37. William P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal
Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193,
203 (2000); see also Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the
Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (2000)
(noting thatthe Supreme Court "appears to believe-perhaps with good reason-that the line
between religion and nonreligion is increasingly thin in contemporary America," and
surveying the possible reasons for such a belief); Ira C. Lupu, To ControlFaction and Protect
Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 384
(1996) [hereinafter Lupu, To Control Faction] ("[I]n a culture as pervasively secular as ours,
claims of secular conscience may be perfectly coincidental psychologically with claims of
religious conscience."); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin De
Siecle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295,314 (2000) ("There is no relevant difference-no difference
relevant to legitimate public policy concerns--between acts of conscience self-understood in
religious terms and acts of conscience self-understood in nonreligious terms.").
38. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 24, at 592.
39. 1 would like to bracket for now the issue of whether the Free Exercise Clause permits
special treatment of religion. I take up the issue briefly in Part m.
40. The approach is more consistent with cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated
religion-specific or sect-specific permissive accommodations. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702 (1994) ("The fact that this school district was created by a special
and unusual Act of the legislature also gives reason for concern whether the benefit received
by the Satmar community is one that the legislature will provide equally to other religious
(and nonreligious) groups."); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1,17 (1989) ("Because
Texas' sales tax exemption for periodicals promulgating the teaching of any religious sect
lacks a secular objective that would justify this preference along with similar benefits for
1018 [Vol. 42:1007
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law. As the Supreme Court repeatedly has said, "[the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no
State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike."41 This principle
applies with particular force to governmental classifications based
on certain suspect characteristics, most notably race, but also
religion.4' Consideration of religion alone, like race, rarely furnishes
justification for differential treatment and almost always reflects
invidious discrimination. It instead might reflect benign
discrimination in favor of religion in the form of religious
exemptions from generally applicable laws, but this is no more
defensible on equal treatment grounds. Religious exemptions,
though benign in purpose, violate the principle of equal treatment
by according special treatment on the basis of a trait irrelevant to
legitimate governmental purpose.'
nonreligious publications or groups, and because it effectively endorses religious belief, the
exemption manifestly fails [the Establishment Clause] test.").
41. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985) (citing Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982)).
42. The following cases are among those noting that religion is a suspect class subject to
strict scrutiny: United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995); Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992); Wade v.
United States, 504 U.S. 181,186 (1992); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8 (1987);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17 (1979); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
43.There is an argument that benign discrimination based solely on race-that is, race-
based affirmative action stands on a different footing. But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). In any event, there might be reason to apply the equal
treatmentprinciple to religious accommodation regardless ofwhether it applies to race-based
affirmative action. See Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village ofKiryas Joel, 96 COLUM. L. REv.
104, 113-14 (1996) (arguing that the justifications for race-based affirmative action are
stronger because it is intended to extinguish the effects of past enslavement and
mistreatment of African Americans). But see Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joeland Two Mistakes
about Equality, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 63-70 (1996) (arguing that affirmative action and
religious accommodation are analogous and should be accorded judicial deference); David E.
Steinberg, Religious Exemptions asAffirmativeAction, 40 EMoRYL.J. 77 (1991) (same). And
there is no reason to apply a less stringent test. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The
Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 100, 102-03 (2000)
("ilt is unclear how traditional government toleration of religious exemptions distinguishes
itself from the now-abandoned toleration of benign racial classifications.... [B]]oth practices
classify on the basis of a suspect trait-race, religion-in order to accomplish a socially
desirable result-enhancing minority opportunities by correcting for the corrosive effects of
past or present racism, enhancing religious freedom by insulating religious practices from
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Free speech law contains a principle of equal treatment that
compels a similar conclusion with respect to many religious
exemptions. That principle prohibits the government from dis-
paraging some speech relative to others on the basis of its content
or viewpoint.4 This principle applies to religious speech,45 often
with significant overlap to the equality principle underlying the
Establishment Clause, because it forbids the government from
suppressing religious speech simply because such speech is
religious.46 This principle, however, also bars the government from
exempting religious speech from restrictions because such speech
is religious.' Thus, the government may not voluntarily accom-
modate religious speech on an exclusive basis without violating the
speech equality principle."8
Assuming that the government may not voluntarily accommodate
religion on an exclusive basis, the next step is to determine on what
basis the government may voluntarily accommodate religion. The
place to start is with the works of commentators who have
addressed the general relationship between permissive accom-
modation and equality. Articles by Professor Lupu and Professors
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager provide particularly
burdensome laws.").
44. See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878,1886 (2000)
(noting that content-based speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny); RA-V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating that the First Amendment prohibits the
government from proscribing speech or expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas
expressed).
45. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
46. See William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 385, 392-93 (1996).
47. See id.
48. Applying the equal treatment principle to permissive accommodation not only avoids
any tension with free speech law (as well as equal protection law), it also avoids the need to
distinguish between exemptions for religious speech and those for religious practice. It is
often difficult to determine whether an exemption targets speech or practice. Does an
exemption from a city zoning law for religious meetings concern speech (or association) on
the grounds that what occurs at such meetings, including religious worship services,
constitutes the spreading of religious ideas? Or do such meetings constitute religious practice
or ritual? Under some analytical approaches, the answers to these questions determine the
applicable legal rules-either general accommodation principles or more stringent speech
standards. Applying the same set of rules to accommodation of religious ideas and religious
conduct eliminates line-drawing problems as well as arbitrary legal distinctions among
similar governmental actions.
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valuable insights on integrating accommodation and equality.49
Ultimately, however, neither article confronts the exact issue with
which I am concerned. In particular, neither article offers legis-
lators a theory or method for proactively accommodating religious
requests for accommodation while simultaneously maintaining
equal treatment.
Professor Lupu argues for a ban on permissive accommodation,
which he defines as "religion-specific action not required by the
Constitution."0 His view rests on an acknowledgment of the equal
treatment principle underlying the Establishment Clause and a
distrust that legislatures will apply it faithfully or apply it at
all." Legislatures award permissive accommodations as a matter
of discretion through the political process.52 Professor Lupu notes,
however, that the political process tends to discriminate against
minority religions as well as nonreligious minorities who lack
numbers, resources, and other means of political influence.5" Thus,
Professor Lupu maintains that accommodation should be reserved
for cases in which the Free Exercise Clause requires it. 5" (He argues
that, although the Establishment Clause contains a comparative
right to equal treatment, the Free Exercise Clause contains a
noncomparative right to religious liberty that permits exclusive
religious accommodations. 5 ) In addition to constitutional argu-
ments, Lupu offers institutional justifications for this position.
49. See sources cited supra note 24.
50. Lupu, The Trouble with Accomnodation, supra note 24, at 779. For a more specific
definition, see Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 24, at 559-60.
51. See Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, supra note 24, at 776-79.
52. See id. at 753.
53. See Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 24, at 600-01; Lupu,
The Trouble with Accommodation, supra note 24, at 777-78.
54. See Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 24, at 560; Lupu, The
Trouble withAccommodation, supra note 24, at 771-72, 779. Professor Lupu also argues for
a reversal of Smith, which significantly restricted the circumstances under which the Free
Exercise Clause requires accommodation. See Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment
Clause, supra note 24, at 609.
55. See Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 24, at 567-70; Lupu,
The Trouble with Accommodation, supra note 24, at 771-72. Professor Lupu later argues,
however, that [ilt seems constitutionally wise" to treat nonreligious exemption claims with
the same respect as religious exemption claims under the Free Exercise Clause (as he
understands and limits those claims). See Lupu, To Control Faction, supra note 37, at 384.
He defends this position in part to avoid any Establishment Clause objections to exclusive
religious accommodations. See id.
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Unlike legislatures, courts must: consider accommodation requests
from politically powerful and powerless religious claimants alike;
issue written decisions justifying the basis and scope of particular
accommodations in a way that ensures the intellectual honesty and
consistency of such accommodations; rest their decisions on
constitutional principles rather than on political favor; and award
accommodations only to sincere and meritorious claimants."6
I share many of Professor Lupu's concerns about the potential for
religious and nonreligious discrimination inherent in permissive
accommodation. 7 Yet I remain unconvinced that a return to a
regime of constitutionally required accommodations is the proper
response or at least the only response. As a practical matter, this
approach depends on an overruling of the Smith decision, and it
appears unlikely that the Supreme Court is inclined to do so.5"
Moreover, the Supreme Court never has understood that regime
as guaranteeing much protection for religious liberty. Even before
Smith, the Court upheld Free Exercise claims only in a handful
of cases. 9 The political process and permissive accommodation
have produced more protection for religious liberty. For example,
members of the Native American Church have had more success
in obtaining voluntary, legislative exemptions to generally applic-
able state drug laws for peyote use than constitutionally mandated
ones.6 0 In my view, it is important to be realistic about the likely
source of protection of religious liberty. Accordingly, it is important
to offer legislatures a theory for voluntarily accommodating reli-
gious liberty that does not violate equality.
Professors Eisgruber and Sager begin to provide such a theory.
They start from the premise that legislatures may not provide
exemptions exclusively for religious claimants.61 Such exemptions
impermissibly"privilege"religious claimants-in the main, members
56. See Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 24, at 600-05.
57. I address some of those concerns more fully in Part III.
58. See City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,512-14 (1997) (declining invitation to revisit
Smith).
59. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (noting that the Court
rarely had granted Free Exercise claims).
60. See id. at 890 ("It is therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an
exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use.").
61. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 24, at 1254-59.
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of majority religions-over their nonreligious counterparts. 2 In
these authors' view, the Religion Clauses forbid privileged treat-
ment of religion. They argue, however, that the Religion Clauses do
permit, and indeed require, legislatures to protect minority
religions from discrimination, defined as unequal treatment relative
to mainstream religions or nonreligion." The Clauses compel
legislatures to "treat the deep, religiously inspired concerns of
minority religious believers with the same regard as that enjoyed
by the deep concerns of citizens generally."64
According to Professors Eisgruber and Sager, legislatures may
provide exemptions for religious claimants only when they already
have provided exemptions for comparable nonreligious claimants-
and indeed in this situation they must do so.6 5 Suppose Congress
had exempted members of PETA and other nonreligious objectors
from the medical treatment requirement in the Medicare and
Medicaid Acts. Or suppose a state already had provided an exemp-
tion from its drug laws for medical use of peyote. According to
Eisgruber and Sager, the state must then grant the requests of
religious objectors for a comparable exemption. Extending the
formerly nonreligious accommodation to similarly situated religious
claimants is necessary to protect them from discrimination relative
to nonreligious claimants.66 In short, it is necessary to ensure "equal
regard."6'
Professors Eisgruber and Sager also permit, indeed require,
religious accommodations in a more awkward, hypothetical
circumstance: when a legislature has granted no exemptions to a
legal prohibition but plausibly would have done so for secular or
62. See id.
63. Professors Eisgruber and Sager primarily frame their theory in terms of judicial
enforcement of accommodation claims. It is restated here in terms of legislative recognition
of such claims. The restatement is consistent with the view of Professors Eisgruber and
Sager that legislatures will take the lead in applying their theory to accommodate religion.
See id. at 1301-06.
64. Id. at 1285.
65. See id. at 1285,1287-88. Professors Eisgruber and Sager note two situations in which
this might occur. A statute might authorize an exemption for a specific class or contain a
functional standard for awarding individual exemptions, such as a "goodcause standard. See
id. at 1287-88.
66. See ad. at 1282-89.
67. See id. at 1282.
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mainstream religious needs, if those needs had in fact existed.68 In
Smith, for example, Professors Eisgruber and Sager ask whether
the state legislature would have granted an exemption to its
generally applicable drug laws for peyote use if one had been
necessary for nonreligious medical purposes or mainstream
religious purposes.69 Professors Eisgruber and Sager maintain that
answers to such hypothetical questions will vary from case to case,
depending on inferences about the "statutory scheme as a whole."70
They note that in the Smith case itself, the Oregon legislature
ultimately provided an exemption to its alcohol laws for sac-
ramental wine use, an arguably analogous exemption request from
a mainstream religion.7' According to Professors Eisgruber and
Sager, this analogy might be sufficient to demonstrate that Oregon
would have granted a peyote exemption if a mainstream religion
had needed it. 2 Put differently, this analogy might be sufficient to
demonstrate legislative discrimination against Native Americans
and thus trigger a peyote exemption for them.7
The Eisgruber/Sager "equal regard" theory offers a sound
reconciliation of religious liberty and equality because it protects
religious claimants from denial of exemptions either accorded to
others, or that would hypothetically in rare cases have been
accorded to others. It is not so clearly helpful, however, when
religious claimants seek an accommodation in the political process
solely because they need one, and not because they have been
denied equal access to one. Furthermore, it is not so clearly helpful
when religious claimants present themselves first for an accom-
modation in the legislative arena, in the absence of prior dis-
crimination. Although the "equal regard" analysis invites this
crucial next (or perhaps antecedent) step, it requires more in the
way of a specific approach. Combining parts of the "equal regard"
theory with some of Professor Lupu's institutional observations, I
propose an approach that permits religious claimants to come first
but ensures that they will not be last.
68. See id. at 1285, 1288-89.
69. See id. at 1288-89.
70. Id. at 1290.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
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II. THE EQUAL LIBERTY APPROACH
The equal liberty approach permits religious claimants to request
accommodations and legislatures to grant them, as long as those
legislatures are prepared to extend such accommodations to
similarly situated nonreligious claimants. 4 Legislatures may
demonstrate their willingness to create an accommodation by
writing a statutory exemption that contains a reasonably broad
class of religious and nonreligious beneficiaries or establishes a
reasonably inclusive functional standard. For example, state
legislatures have extended the animal dissection exemption to
students who oppose dissection for any reason.7 5 So too, Congress
might extend the Medicare and Medicaid exemptions to persons
who object to medical treatment for any reason.7 6 Or Congress
might act more narrowly, extending the exemptions to "any person
who objects to medical treatment for deeply held reasons of
religious, moral or ethical conscience."77 Alternatively, Congress
might rewrite the exemptions to apply to "any person who
74. Legislatures also must comply with other Establishment Clause requirements. For
example, they may not create accommodations that result in excessive entanglement of
government and religion. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (invalidating a
legislative accommodation that delegated governmental authority to a religious sect).
Likewise, they may not enact accommodations that unduly burden third parties. See Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating a legislative accommodation
that enabled private employees to miss work for religious needs even at substantial cost to
their employers). These important limitations have generated their own body ofscholarship.
See, e.g., Eugene VolokhA Common Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLAL. REV.
1465, 1487 (1999) (noting with approval that state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
permit state legislatures to revise judicial accommodation awards when those legislatures
strike a different balance between the conflicting rights of religious claimants and third
parties).
75. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
77. A court might interpret the term "religion" to include some conscientious objectors.
SeeUnited Statesv. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,166 (1965) (interpretingthe religious conscientious
objector provision of the Universal Military Training and Service Act to cover those
individuals who object to war based on a "sincere and meaningful [belief which] occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox beliefin God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption"). But that might vary court by court and statute by
statute. Moreover, as explained below, for democratic reasons legislatures should consider
explicitly extending provisions to nonreligious conscientious objectors rather than relying on
courts to do it for them.
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demonstrates good cause for an exemption to the medical treatment
requirement."8
Regardless of the particular extension selected, legislatures must
make that extension on the face of the statute creating the
accommodation. Legislatures may not choose to enact statutory
exemptions for similarly situated claimants in a piecemeal fashion.
They may not, for example, enact a specific statutory exemption for
Christian Scientists or religious objectors now and one for non-
religious objectors later if and when they present themselves. The
reason is straightforward. The political process provides no
assurance that legislatures will enact an exemption for the
nonreligious claimants if and when the time comes. Professor Lupu
raised a similar concern in arguing for a ban on permissive accom-
modation. 9 Justice Souter raised exactly this concern in striking
down a sect-specific accommodation inBoard ofEducation ofKiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet.80
In Kiryas Joel, New York exempted a group of orthodox Jews
from general school zoning laws in order to create for them a special
religious school district within the boundaries of an existing secular
school district." The Court invalidated the school district, reasoning
in part that New York had failed to provide any assurance that
the next requesting group-religious or not-would receive similar
treatment.8 2 New York left the next group to fight for comparable
treatment in the political process, which was simply too discre-
tionary to guarantee equality. Writing for the Court, Justice Souter
explained:
Because the religious community of Kiryas Joel did not receive
its new governmental authority simply as one of many
communities eligible for equal treatment under a general law,
we have no assurance that the next similarly situated group
seeking a school district of its own will receive one; unlike an
administrative agency's denial of an exemption from a generally
78. Part IV of this Essay discusses issues related to the administration of functional
statutory standards like "good cause."
79. See Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 24, at 600-03.
80. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
81. See id.
82. See id. at 696-710.
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applicable law, .. , a legislature's failure to enact a special law
is itself unreviewable. s3
The only way to ensure equal treatment is to require legislatures
from the start to extend accommodations to a reasonable class of
similarly situated claimants or their functional equivalent.
Herein lies the problem. The equal liberty approach requires
legislatures to determine which potential beneficiaries are similarly
situated before those beneficiaries identify themselves. In other
words, legislatures must assess in the abstract which potential
beneficiaries are entitled to equal treatment. But, as commentators
have noted in this and more general contexts, the concept of equal
treatment does not yield a particular beneficiary class." It is not
self-executing. Rather, it requires reference to some underlying
substantive judgment for determining relevant similarities and
differences among subjects.8 5 A red car and a yellow car are similar
or different depending on whether the relevant criterion for
comparison is vehicle type or color. Selection between the two
involves a substantive judgment that in turn defines the meaning
of equal treatment for the cars.
Equal liberty involves a related but significantly more
complicated judgment. Determining the relevant similarities and
differences between religion and nonreligion asks legislatures
and courts to determine the rationale for protecting religious
liberty and the class of secular values to which that rationale
also applies.8 These determinations involve subjective judgments
that are open to debate. There is no consensus for why we protect
religious liberty.'7 For example, we might protect religious liberty
to promote individual conscience,8 personal autonomy,8 9 civic
83. Id at 703 (footnote and citation omitted).
84. See Smith, supra note 26, at 63-70; Westen, supra note 23, at 546 ("Just as no
categories of 'like' people exist in nature, neither do categories of 'like' treatment exist.").
85. See Westen, supra note 26, at 551-53.
86. In addition, it requires a definition of "religious" liberty.
87. See Laycock, supra note 32, at 314 ("Contemporary scholars have puzzled over why
the Constitution would specially protect religious liberty, as distinguished from liberty in
other domains.").
88. See McConnell, supra note 23, at 715.
89. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values:
Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1600-03
(1987) ("Because individuality is in many respects a social phenomenon ... a religious
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virtue, 9° or pluralism.9 ' We might protect religious liberty simply
because it is special.92 Or we might vary the rationale with the
accommodation and the claimant. For example, we might protect
religious individuals in a particular case to ensure their freedom of
conscience while protecting religious institutions in another to
acknowledge their social contribution.
Likewise, there is no consensus on what is comparable to religion.
The comparable secular class will depend as an initial matter on
the rationale for protecting religious liberty. Suppose Congress
exempts Christian Scientists from the medical treatment require-
ments in the Medicare and Medicare Act to relieve those individuals
of the choice between their deeply held religious beliefs and their
health. Congress might reasonably extend those exemptions to
individuals who object to medical treatment for other deeply held
religious, moral, or ethical beliefs in order to relieve those
individuals of a comparable choice. In so doing, Congress would not
only include religious individuals like Christian Scientists who
oppose medical treatment because they prefer faith healing but
other individuals with religious objections to medical treatment-
perhaps those whose religion forbids practices involving animal
research and testing.9" Congress also would reach individuals who
prefer holistic healing methods for nonreligious spiritual reasons,
as well as those who hold moral or ethical objections to medical
community committed to the autonomy, responsibility, and dignity of its members will
enhance the unique personality development of each.... [IHIostility toward or ignorance of
religious communities risks diminishing or altogether eliminating a critical context by which
individuals choose their values and define the meaning of their existence.").
90. See Marshall, supra note 31, at 245 (stating that religion "imbues a sense of
community obligation and virtue into the mind of the citizen-believer that is necessary to
maintain a system of self-government").
91. See Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 293,
302 (1996) ("One might understand the core value of the clauses to be the promotion of
religious pluralism."); Marshall, supra note 46, at 388 ("Religion is also central to the
fostering of pluralism-itself an important part of the American experiment.").
92. See John H. Garvey, AnAnti-LiberalArgument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 275,283 (1996) ("The best reasons for protecting religious freedom rest on the
assumption that religion is a good thing."); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 149-50 (1991) (arguing that
protection for religious liberty cannot be understood in nonreligious terms).
93. Cf Jenkins v. Angelone, 948 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Va. 1996) (involving RFRA claim
asserted by prison inmate claiming his religion required a vegan meal).
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treatment because it involves animal research and testing-
perhaps members of PETA.
But this hypothetical raises more questions than it answers: Why
members of PETA? And why those who object to medical treatment
for "other deeply held religious, moral or ethical beliefs" and not
those who prefer nursing care for "shallow" reasons or for beliefs
unrelated to individual conscience-say, because they fear doctors
or hospitals? State legislatures allow students to invoke the animal
dissection exemption for any reason."5 Why not require the same of
Congress?
Consider another example. Suppose a state legislature exempts
peyote use from its drug laws in order to accommodate the religious
practices of Native Americans. At the same time, the legislature
might recognize other important uses-such as medical use to avoid
pain and suffering or to improve the quality of life. But in what
sense is medical use really comparable to religious use? And what
other uses should or should not qualify for an exemption? These
questions come down to whether it is possible to determine the
rationale for protecting religious liberty and the comparable
nonreligious class, given the open-ended nature of both inquiries.
Thus, the ultimate question is whether it is possible ever to ensure
equal liberty in the absence of a concrete metric for its measure.
Some might claim that this question offers immediate reason to
reject equal liberty as simply too indeterminate to produce a
workable approach to permissive accommodation. But arguments
about fatal indeterminacy in the law ought to be regarded with
skepticism. Every interpretive approach-whether constitutional or
statutory-involves a certain amount of indeterminacy. This is
particularly true of approaches interpreting capacious concepts like
religious liberty and equality. And it is equally true of approaches
that rely on bright-line rules rather than discretionary standards.
Michael McConnell has provided a seemingly bright-line approach
in this context, requiring accommodation when it would minimize
governmental interference with religion and neither induce
religious practice nor unduly burden others.' Even putting aside
94. See Smith, supra note 26, at 68.
95. See supra note 6.
96. See McConnell, supra note 23, at 735-39.
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issues raised by inducement and third-party burdens, his approach
involves intractable questions about what constitutes "govern-
mental interference" and "religion.9 7 Indeterminacy is purely a
matter of degree.
Moreover, the equal liberty approach is not nearly as indeter-
minate as it initially might appear. The equal liberty approach does
not require a theoretical measure of equality between religion and
nonreligion. With respect to selecting a rationale for protecting
religious liberty, the equal liberty approach merely requires
legislatures to choose a rationale for accommodating religious
claimants and extrapolate from that rationale a reasonable class of
similarly situated nonreligious beneficiaries. It merely requires
legislatures to select some reason for protecting religious liberty
that supports comparison to some class of nonreligious values in a
particular case.
Of course, the equal liberty approach necessarily places off the
table at least one theory for protecting religious liberty6-namely,
that religion is special-because that theory permits no comparison
to another class and supports exclusive religious accommodations.
We may well value religious liberty in certain circumstances
because it is special. But for the government to treat religion as
special in the political process because religion is presumptively
special fundamentally disregards the basic structure of equality
analysis. If legislatures are to make any sense of the Establishment
Clause as containing an equality principle or, more emphatically,
a prohibition on discretionary preference for religion, they must
select a theory of religious liberty that permits comparison to
nonreligious liberty.9"
97. Although the equal liberty approachintroduces its own openissues, itmay avoid these
issues in a number of cases. Legislatures will not have to find "governmental interference"
with religion if broadly benefiting both religion and nonreligion in the form of an exemption
from a generally applicable law. Nor will legislatures have to define "religion" if they extend
exemptions to both religious and nonreligious conscience. Cf Marshall, supra note 37, at 213
("Concerns with adjudicating religion as a distinct phenomenon mitigate in favor of the
equality approach, because the equality approach necessarily avoids the intractable problems
inherent in differentiating between religion and nonreligion.").
98. Steven Smith disagrees. He argues that rejection of "the distinctiveness of religion as
religion" reflects a covert substantive judgment about religion that skews equality analysis
from the outset. Smith, supra note 26, at 68. Nonetheless, this judgment is necessary for
equality analysis to be anything more than a formalistic construct. Acceptance of the
distinctiveness of religion as religion effectively forecloses equality analysis before it starts.
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As for the scope of the comparable secular class, the equal liberty
approach simply seeks to implement the Establishment Clause
prohibition on religious preference. It, like the Establishment
Clause, only requires legislatures to create a nonreligious class
sufficiently broad to negate any inference of special treatment for
religion.9 This is not an unfamiliar standard. It is the one that
legislatures routinely employ when including religion among other
beneficiaries in governmental aid programs.' 0 And they sometimes
employ this standard when exempting religion among other
beneficiaries from governmental regulations. The New York
Constitution, like other state constitutions and laws, permits tax
exemptions for "real or personal property used exclusively for
religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law and
owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted
exclusively for one or more of such purposes and not operating for
profit."' In Walz v. Tax Commission, the Supreme Court upheld a
tax exemption for a church property premised on this constitutional
provision. 10 2 The Court remarked:
In other words, it renders the equality principle superfluous and endorses the alternative
constitutional position that accommodation is permissible with respect to religion and only
religion. That position must be independently justified. Note that equality analysis does not
preclude all arguments that religion is special. Legislatures still may protect religion alone
if it is specially or uniquely burdened by a generally applicable law. This might occur rarely
because it is almost always possible that some similarly situated religious or nonreligious
claimant will materialize.
99. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.) ("In any particular case the critical question is
whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly
concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter.").
100. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2541 (2000) (plurality opinion) (upholding
funding for computers to schools selected according to neutral criteria); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 221 (1997) (upholding a federally funded remedial education program for
schools selected according to neutral criteria); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608 (1988)
(upholding a statute funding a "wide spectrum of organizations" in addressing adolescent
sexuality because the law was "neutral with respect to the grantee's status as a sectarian or
purely secular institution"); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 487 (1986) (upholding a vocational tuition grant to students "made available generally
without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefited"); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) ("The provision of benefits
to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect.").
101. Watz, 397 U.S. at 666-67 (emphasis added) (quoting article 16, section 1 of the New
York Constitution).
102. Id. at 667.
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New York, in common with the other States, has determined
that certain entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to
the community at large, and that foster its moral or mental
improvement, should not be inhibited in their activities by
property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties for
nonpayment of taxes. It has not singled out one particular
church or religious group or even churches as such; rather, it
has granted exemption to all houses of religious worship within
a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public
corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds,
scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups."' 3
While the New York constitutional provision does not necessarily
create theoretical equality between religion and nonreligion, it does
establish a kind of safe harbor from Establishment Clause
challenge. It creates a class so broad that no one would think it
advances religion, even though it expressly or implicitly
encompasses religion. The same might be said of the Court's
construction in United States v. Seeger of the religious conscientious
objector provision of the federal military draft statute.'0 4 The Court
interpreted the provision to include those individuals who object to
war based on "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of
those admittedly qualifying for the exemption."' Legislatures
could include similar language or perhaps a short form (e.g., deeply
held religious, moral, or ethical beliefs0 6) in other conscientious
objector accommodations. Or they could move to broader, functional
safe harbors, extending conscientious objector provisions to
individuals who oppose generally applicable laws for "good cause"
or even for "any reason" where appropriate.
103. Id. at 672-73 (internal quotation omitted).
104. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
105. Id. at 176 (interpreting § 456(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1958)).
106. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970) ("What is necessary under
Seeger for a registrant's conscientious objection to allwar to be 'religious'within the meaning
of§ 6(j) is that this opposition to war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of
traditional religious convictions.").
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Any equality issues that remain in defining the scope of an
accommodation likely will not be theoretical but will turn, like
many issues of statutory construction, on the legislative intent
underlying the statutory exemption.'" Suppose Congress extends
its religious Medicare and Medicaid exemptions to those individuals
who object to medical treatment for deeply held moral or ethical
reasons, but denies relief to individuals who fear doctors or simply
prefer nursing care. Whether the denial violates equal liberty will
depend on an analysis of the substantive legislative rationale for
the accommodation. The denial is consistent with equal treatment
if, for example, Congress intended only to accommodate belief
structures based on deeply held conscientious scruples. But the
denial may be inconsistent with equal treatment if Congress
intended broadly to accommodate personal autonomy in the
selection of health care.'
Despite these clarifications, the equal liberty approach retains
some indeterminacy. The proper reaction, however, is not to reject
the equal liberty approach in favor of one that introduces its own
indeterminacy and Establishment Clause problems, like Professor
McConnell's.'0 9 The better tack is to explore the possibility of an
institutional framework for focusing the inquiry. An institutional
framework attempts to address the question of how to ensure equal
liberty by considering who should ensure equal liberty-legislatures
or courts. More particularly, it considers whether courts should
accord legislatures deference in selecting a rationale for protecting
religious liberty and in translating that rationale into an
appropriate beneficiary class or functional standard.
107. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) ("How expansive the class
of exempt organizations or activities must be to withstand constitutional assault depends
upon the State's secular aim in granting a tax exemption.").
108. See id. at 15-16 ("If the State chose to subsidize, by means of a tax exemption, all
groups that contributedto the community's cultural, intellectual, andmoral betterment, then
the exemption for religious publications could be retained, provided thatthe exemption swept
as widely as the property tax exemption... upheld in Walz. By contrast, if Texas sought to
promote reflection and discussion about questions of ultimate value and the contours of a
good or meaningful life, then a tax exemption would have to be available to an extended
range of associations w]iose publications were substantially devoted to such matters...
(footnote omitted).
109. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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There is reason to allow legislatures significant deference in
crafting permissive accommodations. As an institutional matter,
legislatures are better able than courts to resolve the complex
balancing of governmental interests and resources often involved in
determining the proper scope of particular exemptions. Congress
might decide that accommodating personal autonomy in the
selection of health care might undermine its interest in creating the
Medicare and Medicaid system by encouraging large numbers of
patients to relinquish medical treatment. Accommodating personal
autonomy also might increase costs by causing those patients who
receive only nursing care to suffer prolonged or more serious
illnesses. Conversely, Congress might determine that a broad
accommodation actually would save costs by encouraging more
patients to accept a "subset" of government benefits-nursing care
but not medical care.11 ° Furthermore, Congress might determine
that most patients would not voluntarily surrender medical care in
order to receive the stand-alone nursing care benefit. These are
similar to and often precisely the kind of policy determinations from
which the Supreme Court recoiled in Smith.'
Apart from institutional concerns, there are democratic reasons
for allowing legislatures and not courts to make the primary
judgments necessary to permissive accommodation. Given the lack
of consensus in this area, legislatures ought to test proposed
accommodations in the political process." They also ought to get
into the habit of thinking in principled terms about accommodating
religious liberty rather than deflecting that responsibility to the
courts. By thinking in this way, legislatures will generate better,
more public-regarding exemptions rather than exemptions that
110. See Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084,1095-
96 (8th Cir. 2000).
111. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); see also Lupu, To Control
Faction, supra note 37, at 376 ("Recognizing the constitutional choice as one between
majoritarian, political control [of the religion-exempting process] versus judicial control of
the religion-exempting process, Smith opts for the former to save the judicial branch from
the perceived difficulties such a task entails."); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model For
Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1487 (1999) (noting with approval that state
religious freedom restoration acts permit state legislatures to revise judicial accommodation
awards when contrary to state interests).
112. See Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 16 ("It is not our responsibility to specify which
permissible secular objectives, if any, the State should pursue to justify a tax exemption for
religious periodicals. That charge rests with the Texas Legislature.").
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merely serve narrow interests. But they also will produce better
laws. If legislatures must deliberate and agree upon the principles
for allocating special exemptions, they necessarily will have to
confront the degree to which they are committed to general
regulatory intervention in the first instance.
11 3
Although there is reason to adopt a'general posture of judicial
deference to legislative judgments about the proper objective and
scope of permissive accommodations, a posture of total deference is
inadequate to prevent instances of religious favoritism. Religious
favoritism occurs when accommodations explicitly single out
religion or a particular religion for special treatment. A similar
problem arises with respect to facially inclusive and facially neutral
accommodations-those that provide exemptions to religious and
nonreligious beneficiaries alike and those that contain a general,
religion-neutral accommodation policy. Facially inclusive accom-
modations might contain a sham or token class of beneficiaries
rather than one that reflects genuine breadth. Facially inclusive
and facially neutral accommodations might contain restrictions on
eligibility that fence out all but religious or only some religious
claimants. Suppose Congress extended the Medicare and Medicaid
exemptions to all individuals who object to medical treatment for
reasons of conscience but required those individuals, as a condition
of receiving stand-alone nursing care benefits, to seek nursing care
in an institution that itself provides no medical treatment for
reasons of conscience. Depending on the likely availability and
accessibility of such nonmedical institutions, this condition might
serve to ensure that only Christian Scientists receive stand-alone
nursing care benefits.1 '
It is necessary then to craft a judicial mechanism for preventing
religious favoritism, but one that operates in the absence of a
113. Legislatures frequently relieve themselves of the responsibility to consider the effect
of generally applicable laws on religion and other interests by enacting flat prohibitions and
delegating exemption authority to administrative agencies. See discussion infra Part IV.
Delegation to administrative agencies is different from delegation to courts, however. Federal
agencies, for example, are democratically accountable to the public through the President.
In addition, they frequently are in a better institutional position than courts or legislatures
to weigh the relative costs and benefits of awarding particular exemptions.
114. See Min De Parle, 212 F.3d at 1103 (Lay, J., dissenting) ("Congress' incredibly
narrow crafting of the new provisions leaves no doubt regarding their lack of neutrality and
denominational preference for Christian Scientists.").
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determinate definition of equality and acknowledges the legislative
policy judgments that inhere accordingly. One possibility that sug-
gests itself is a process-oriented tool for prodding legislatures
themselves to demonstrate that their accommodations reflect
fair consideration of the equal liberty principle. Such a tool would
force legislatures to consider equal liberty when they undertake
to protect religious liberty by requiring them openly to justify
the scope of any permissive accommodation in equality terms.
More specifically, it would call on courts to uphold a permissive
accommodation if accompanied by plausible legislative reasons
justifying its scope. And it would call on courts to invalidate any
permissive accommodation that is unaccompanied by such reasons.
Such reasons might appear in a legislative findings section on the
face of the accommodation or in the legislative record supporting
the accommodation. The idea is that requiring legislatures to ar-
ticulate the reasons for making particular decisions will produce
good decisions in the first instance. It also will expose bad ones to
public and judicial scrutiny. But it will not invite courts to
substitute their judgment for that of the legislature, at least not
directly or immediately in most cases.115
While plausible in theory, the reason-giving requirement may
seem difficult as applied because courts lack a standard for judging
the legislative reasons offered in support of a particular accom-
modation. Courts, however, will not need a specific standard in
many cases. Some reasons will be plainly inadequate-such as
those premised on the theory that religion is special. And some will
be plainly sufficient-such as those that incorporate a safe harbor
or some equally generous class of beneficiaries. Others may be
harder to evaluate because they defend novel or narrow classes.
Courts might allow legislative judgments to prevail in such close
cases. In other words, they might accord legislative findings a
presumption of validity. That is not to say that courts would be
unjustified in taking the opposite course, invalidating arguably
underinclusive accommodations in order to overprotect equality.
But the former course would be the wiser. Although less protective
115. In this sense, reason giving can be called a "minimalist" judicial strategy. For a
general discussion ofjudicial minimalism, see CASsR. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE ATATImE(1999).
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of equality, it would better reflect the often complex and essentially
political nature of the legislative judgments involved.
This type of reason-giving requirement may seem institutionally
odd as applied to legislatures. It fits more comfortably with
administrative agencies, which long have been required to explain
the factual and legal basis for their decisions. 6 Legislatures
normally are not required to do the same. But asking legislatures
to furnish reasons is less restrictive of permissive accommodation
than the alternative for detecting and preventing impermissible
religious favoritism. Courts instead could invalidate legislative
actions that single out religion for special exemptions. As discussed
above, there is general support for this approach in the law of equal
protection and free speech. The reason-giving requirement creates
more room for permissive accommodation, although not unlimited
room. It tells courts to uphold permissive accommodations on
condition that legislatures agree to supply reasons justifying those
accommodations.
Furthermore, the requirement of legislative reason giving is not
entirely unfamiliar to the law. The Supreme Court has articulated
such a requirement in recent cases involving principles of federal
constitutional power and structure. For example, in United States
v. Lopez, the Court held that the federal Gun Free School Zones Act,
which prohibited possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a
school, exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause
in the absence, among other things, of congressional findings
demonstrating that such possession substantially affects interstate
commerce."7 Although careful to note that "Congress normally is
not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens
that an activity has on interstate commerce," the Court emphasized
the role of such findings in confirming the "legislative judgment"
that a federal statute operating in an area of traditional state
concern has a substantial effect on interstate commerce when "no
such substantial effect [is visible to the naked eye." i"'
116. See Motor Vehicle Mfs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29,48-49 (1983) ("We have frequently reiterated that an agency must cogently
explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner, and we affirm that principle
again today.").
117. 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995).
118. Id. at 563.
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Similarly, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that the
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which required
federal and state governments to demonstrate a compelling in-
terest for generally applicable laws that substantially burden
religious exercise, exceeded Congress's power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to remedy and prevent discrimination in
the absence ofa "legislative record" containing"examples of modern
instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious
bigotry."119 Again, careful to note that the deficient legislative re-
cord was not RFRA's only or even most serious shortcoming, the
Court nonetheless suggested that a better record would have helped
to support Congress's apparent determination that RFRA was an
appropriate preventative or remedial measure. 20
A better record also would aid courts in determining whether a
particular permissive accommodation is an appropriate exemption.
And there is an argument that imposing a reason-giving require-
ment is even more defensible in the permissive accommodation
context than in the federalism context because it aids courts
in protecting a particularly important set of interests-namely,
equality and individual liberty interests." Note, however, that for
the reason-giving requirement to work in any case, it must be
understood to reflect a considered judgment about the proper
division of labor between legislatures and courts in particular
contexts. The Court recently has raised a question whether it
understands the reason-giving requirement in this way or whether
it simply uses lack of findings as a convenient justification for
striking down laws to which it is hostile. In United States v.
Morrison, the Court indicated that the presence of congressional
119. 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1997).
120. See id.
121. In this regard, consider other cases involving individual rights in which the Court
has employed a process-oriented approach similar to the requirement of reason giving. In
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,541-42 (1996), the Court took a"hard look" at a state
policy designed to remedy discrimination against women seeking a military education at the
all-male Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Specifically, the Court required the state to supply
an adequate basis for its judgment that providing a separate military education for women
equaled the military education it provided for men at VMI. See id. The Court ultimately
found such as basis lacking. See id. at 551. In Kent v. DuUes, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958), the
Court required a clear statement from Congress before concluding that Congress intended
to confer discretion on the INS to deny passports to communists.
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findings would not automatically insulate a federal law from
invalidation. 12 And despite the presence of findings, it invalidated
the Violence Against Women Act as beyond Congress's reach under
the Commerce Clause.' The reason-giving requirement offers little
practical benefit and fails to justify its costs unless courts honor the
institutional arrangement it implicitly contains by, as suggested
above, according a presumption of validity to legislative findings.
To summarize, the equal liberty approach seeks to mediate the
fundamental tension between religious liberty and equality. Not
surprisingly, the approach introduces certain difficulties of its own.
It requires legislatures to confront hard questions and make
contestable judgments in order to provide a measure of equal liberty
when they endeavor to protect religious liberty. In particular, it
requires legislatures to determine why they protect religious liberty
in a given case and which secular values deserve comparable
protection. The approach acknowledges the discretion involved in
this task and the potential for religious favoritism that lurks within
it by seeking an implementation that allows legislatures latitude in
formulating permissive accommodations as long as they offer
credible equality-based justifications for their choices.
Ill. OBJECTIONS TO THE EQUAL LIBERTY APPROACH
There are three objections to the equal liberty approach that
merit consideration and response. The first objection concerns the
administrative and financial burden that equal liberty will impose
on permissive accommodation. The contention is that equal liberty
will increase the complexity and cost of awarding accommodations,
at times to a prohibitive level. The result is that, occasionally and
perhaps frequently, neither the religious claimants nor their
nonreligious counterparts will receive an accommodation in the
political process. Equal liberty will choke off permissive accom-
modation and provide insufficient protection for religious liberty.
122. 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2000) ("But the existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation. [Tihe
constitutional power of Congress to regulate . . . is ultimately a judicial rather than a
legislative question.").
123. See id.
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This objection incorrectly assumes that some relief is better than
no relief, even if that relief is unconstitutional. Assume that a state
does not have enough money to educate all of its children, so it
decides to send just the boys to school. No liberal government
should handle the issue of scarce or limited resources in such an
arbitrary and discriminatory fashion-and indeed, the Equal
Protection Clause would not tolerate such action. It is unclear why
the conclusion should be any different with respect to exemptions
and religion rather than benefits and gender, whether under the
Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause or both. The
costs imposed by the equal liberty approach are the costs of a
regime committed not only to religious liberty of some but to equal
treatment of all.124
The second objection concerns the delay that the equal liberty
approach will impose on permissive accommodation. The approach
directs courts to invalidate statutory exemptions that lack legis-
lative reasons justifying their scope or that contain reasons failing
at least arguably to ensure equality. Pending reenactment, the
exemptions remain invalid. Furthermore, some exemptions may
never be reenacted because they may not survive the legislative
process anew or overcome the financial and administrative burdens
highlighted in the first objection. 25 In either case, religious liberty
is made to wait.
This objection does not target the equal liberty approach as much
as its choice of implementation or of remedy. The objection arises
because the equal liberty approach instructs courts to invalidate
accommodations rather than extend them. Sometimes courts are
willing to repair problematic statutes by effectively rewriting
them. 6 Indeed, courts have been willing, at least prior to Smith, to
124. Put differently, they are the costs of a regime that recognizes religious liberty in this
context as a specific example of a greater constitutional commitment to liberty generally and
that perceives equal liberty, like equality generally, as a constitutional imperative.
125. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399,1419 (2000) ("A new bill (even one
that revives a prior law) first must compete with a slew of others for legislative attention,
and then must [in the context of federal legislation] survive the constitutional requirements
of bicameralism and presentment. These obstacles reduce the likelihood that an invalidated
statute will be reenacted or reenacted promptly.").
126. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (severing an
unconstitutional provision from a federal statute); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653
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read some generally applicable laws to contain exemptions for
religious claimants when the Free Exercise Clause so requires.'
7
The equal liberty approach could follow a similar course, directing
courts to extend preferential or underinclusive accommodations
to an appropriate, judicially determined beneficiary class rather
than remanding the accommodation for legislative extension or
explanation.'
Although legislative remand injects delay and uncertainty into
the permissive accommodation process, it is preferable to judicial
reconstruction. As noted above, it is beneficial from an institutional
perspective for courts to avoid the policy judgments about govern-
mental interests and resources inherent in permissive accom-
modation. Of course, not every accommodation involves complex
policy judgments. For example, courts might extend exemptions for
religious conscience with relative ease to nonreligious conscience.
The analogy between religious conscience and nonreligious con-
science has become so well embedded in our constitutional tradition
and contemporary culture that courts might make it as reflexively
as legislatures.' Courts, however, cannot make analogies as
simply in other cases, most notably those involving religious
institutions rather than individuals.130 Nor can they make the
individual-conscience analogy reliably in every case involving
individuals. Extending an exemption to individuals who object to
the draft or dissection for reasons of individual conscience is one
thing. Extending an exemption to individuals who object to peyote
(1984) (same); Industrial Union Dep'tv. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,646 (1980)
(supplying a particular regulatory standard in a federal statute to avoid a nondelegation
problem).
127. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,235-36 (1972) (creating an exemption to
mandatory school attendance law for Amish children over the age of 15).
128. Cf Marshall, supra note 37, at 202-11 (arguing that courts should extend exemptions
won by religious claimants under the Free Exercise Clause to similarly situated nonreligious
claimants).
129. Cf Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular. A
Foundational Challenge to FirstAmendment Theory, 36 WM. &MARYL. REV. 837,961 (1995)
(arguing that the concept of religious freedom in constitutional law should "focus... on the
protection of individual conscience" rather than religious conscience).
130. Some exemptions for religious institutions can be said to protect the "conscience" of
those institutions-for example, an exemption for churches to choose their own clergy or to
restrict the membership of their clergy based on sex or ethnicity. See Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
334-35, 338 (1987).
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bans for "religious, moral, or ethical" reasons is another. It is not
obvious why conscience ought to limit the relevant class of would-be
peyote smokers. Individuals who wish to smoke peyote for medical
reasons (i.e., to alleviate pain and suffering or to improve quality of
life) also have a logical and weighty claim to an exemption. Whether
they have an equally logical and weighty claim is a policy judgment
that in the first instance requires legislative deliberation.
Furthermore, it is valuable from a democratic standpoint for
legislatures to consider the proper scope of exemptions from laws
they create. As noted above, legislatures ought to subject con-
troversial exemptions to public scrutiny. More generally, they ought
to consider in disciplined fashion the need for an exemption rather
than deflecting this responsibility to the judiciary. Forcing them to
do so may cause them to reflect on the propriety of the overarching
regulatory law, improving accountability on the whole.
Finally, it may even be better from a religious liberty vantage for
courts to avoid extending exemptions in certain cases. When a court
extends an exemption by selecting a particular beneficiary class or
functional standard, it runs the risk of imposing administrative or
financial costs that might have been avoided by picking a different
class or standard. The legislature might oppose those costs, but
nonetheless hesitate to question whether the judicial selection is
necessary or merely sufficient for constitutional purposes. The
legislature instead might opt to repeal the accommodation entirely.
In such a case, religious liberty is not just made to wait; it is denied
altogether.
The third objection to the equal liberty approach concerns
minority religions. The claim is that the political process provides
insufficient protection for the religious liberty of minority religions.
Minority religions receive accommodations only ifmajority religions
(or a nonreligious majority) seek the same treatment. While equal
access to majority accommodations is of some benefit, it is not
enough. Minority religions often lack the political support to obtain
the accommodations that they, and they alone, need.
Although quite powerful, this objection does not apply exclusively
to the equal liberty approach but to any theory of permissive
accommodation. As the Court aptly noted in Smith, "[uit may fairly
be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are
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not widely engaged in... .""' It is important to note, however, that
regularizing the permissive accommodation process, as the equal
liberty approach does, may go some distance toward protecting
religious minorities from the insensitive or hostile treatment that
gives rise to convincing claims of mandatory accommodation.
Legislatures accustomed to making careful and systematic judg-
ments about the kinds of exemptions they can and should offer as
a permissive matter, may be less likely to make the kinds of
mistakes that call for exemptions as a mandatory matter. For
example, a legislature thinking conscientiously about accom-
modation might choose to exempt religious and certain other peyote
use from its drug laws, thereby eliminating the need for a man-
datory exemption to protect Native Americans. In this way, the
equal liberty approach may reduce the objection acknowledged in
Smith, and may take considerable pressure off of the result in the
Smith case as well.
To the extent the equal liberty approach does not adequately
protect religious minorities, there is a forceful argument for re-
storing the pre-Smith regime of constitutionally mandated accom-
modation with respect to generally applicable laws.132 A return to
that regime would ensure compulsory consideration of the ex-
emption claims of minority and majority religions alike under the
Free Exercise Clause. It becomes necessary, then, to consider the
viability of the constitutional regime.
The constitutional accommodation regime has foundered on its
own limitations, however. The Supreme Court rejected it as "a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality
of all religious beliefs."133 Of course, there is ample room for debate
131. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). For critiques of Smith along
these lines, see Douglas LaycockFormal, Substantive, andDisaggregatedNeutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993,1014-15 (1990), and Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1109, 1130-32 (1990).
132. See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J.
1611,1613,1643-44 (1993); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 61-63, 68 (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause ought to protect the beliefs and
practices of those religious individuals unable to protect themselves in the political process);
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Cmu. L. REV. 115, 139
(1992).
133. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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about whether such a system is worse for democracy than one in
which religious liberty depends upon political courtesy."3 4
In any event, as explained above, the constitutional system never
provided robust protection even for members of majority religions.
Members of minority religions-particularly as they diverged
further from the mainstream-did not fare better and most likely
fared far worse. Moreover, minority claimants have not always
fared poorly in the political process. Witness members of the Native
American Church who successfully obtained legislative exemptions
to generally applicable state drug laws allowing them to smoke
peyote in observance of their religion. Consider also the members
of the orthodox Jewish community in Kiryas Joel, as well as the
Christian Scientists. Minority religious groups frequently possess
enough political power, either alone or with the backing of other
religious groups, or engender enough political compassion to
achieve their goals.
But even if a return to constitutional accommodation would
increase the liberty of minority religions at the margins, such a
return would be imprudent in the absence of some procedural or
institutional means for ensuring equality between religion and
nonreligion. Of course, many argue as a theoretical matter that the
Free Exercise Clause does not require equality between religion and
nonreligion. They claim that the Free Exercise Clause permits
exclusive religious accommodations. Professor Lupu has tendered
a version of this argument, as indicated above."3 5 Others disagree,
contending that the Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment
Clause, forbids exclusive religious accommodation.'36 In my view,
134. For criticism of Smith, see James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop,
79 CAL. L. REv. 91 (1991). See also Laycock, supra note 132, at 3-4; Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause, supra note 24, at 570-74; McConnell, supra note 131, at 1145-46
(1990); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall ofReligious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. RsV. 149, 231-37 (1991). For a defense of Smith, see Marci A. Hamilton, The
Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological
Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIo ST. L.J. 713, 749 (1993) (arguing
thatSmith is consistentwith prior case law); MarciA. Hamilton, The ConstitutionalRhetoric
of Religion, 20 U. ARuc LrE RoCK L.J. 619 (1998) (arguing in favor ofSmith as against the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Cmu. L. REv. 308, 309 (1991) (defending the result in Smith but
not the reasoning).
135. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
136. For example, Professors Eisgruber and Sager understand the Constitution to prohibit
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"ilt seems constitutionally wise" to treat nonreligious exemption
claims with the same respect as religious exemption claims under
the Free Exercise Clause."3 7 Doing so avoids any tension with the
Establishment Clause, and, more importantly, acknowledges that
mandatory accommodation raises many of the same equality
concerns as permissive accommodation. Thus, it is constitutionally
prudent to reconcile religious liberty and equality with respect to
both mandatory and permissive accommodation.
There are two procedural arrangements for maintaining equality
under a pre-Smith approach to mandatory accommodation. The
first option is to allow nonreligious claimants to assert their own
exemption claims under the Free Exercise Clause on the same basis
as religious claimants. The second option is to extend exemptions
secured by religious claimants under the Free Exercise Clause to
nonreligious claimants. As framed, both options are institutionally
problematic because they ask courts to engage in precisely the same
type of open-ended comparability analysis that the equal liberty
approach implores them to avoid. Specifically, they compel courts
to determine which nonreligious claimants are similarly situated to
religious claimants and thereby entitled either to seek their own
exemptions or to seek the benefits of religious exemptions under the
Free Exercise Clause.
There is a way around these difficulties that bears mentioning.
It is possible to limit Free Exercise claims to claims of individual
religious conscience. Not only are these claims at the core of the
Free Exercise Clause, they also are easy for courts to make
available to nonreligious claimants-at least in those cases that fit
the well-established conscientious objector paradigm.3 8 As noted
any accommodation, regardless of its asserted source, that flows only to religion. See
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 24. They read the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause to contain a principle of "equal regard! for all citizens that is violated
by special treatment of some citizens solely on the grounds of their religiosity. See id. at
1282-83. Professor Marshall also reads both clauses to contain the principle of equal
treatment. See Marshall, supra note 37, at 194-96. In his view, this equality principle
requires courts to extend allFree Exercise accommodations to similarly situated nonreligious
individuals. See id. at 204-06.
137. Lupu, To Control Faction, supra note 37, at 384.
138. This is different from the issue of whether courts should extend permissive
accommodations tononreligious conscience. Legislatures oughtto make thisjudgmentinthe
first instance for democratic reasons, even if courts find themselves capable of doing so as
an institutional matter.
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above, it is not always easy for courts to determine whether a
particular exemption fits the conscientious objector paradigm.
Accordingly, courts would have to be restrained in their application
of this proposal even to claims involving individuals. Furthermore,
they would be disabled entirely from entertaining other Free
Exercise claims, including most claims raised by religious insti-
tutions. This limitation represents a significant departure from pre-
Smith law and is not entirely satisfying as a means for ensuring
religious liberty. But, one might argue, it is better than the Smith
regime at protecting religious liberty (especially the liberty of
minority religions) and better than the pre-Smith regime at
protecting equality.
Although permissive accommodation encounters significant
objections, it remains preferable to the alternatives. It remains
preferable to a system of inequality between religion and non-
religion, even if the result is fewer accommodations overall. It also
remains preferable to a scheme of court-imposed remedies for
inequality between religion and nonreligion, even if the result is
delay and uncertainty. Finally, it remains preferable to a regime of
constitutionally mandated exemptions, even if the result is fewer
exemptions for minority religions at the margins. The approach is
consistent, however, both as a theoretical and practical matter, with
a limited constitutional right to an exemption for individual
conscientious objection.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE EQUAL LIBERTY
APPROACH
In an effort to cover all the bases, a final issue to consider briefly
is the effect of the equal liberty approach on accommodations
implemented by administrative agencies or officials. Frequently,
legislatures do not grant exemptions to particular beneficiaries but
instead delegate discretion to agencies to award such exemptions.139
139. Indeed, the possibility of delegation diminishes any concern about forcing
legislatures to think ahead too much when formulating permissive accommodations.
Legislatures do not have to think ahead much at all if theywrite accommodations in general
terms and leave the specific application to an agency. Of course, that simply defers the
problem to the agency. But agencies may be more familiar with--or at least have better
access to information about-potential beneficiaries, workable accommodation policies, and
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Agencies sometimes receive express statutory authority to confer
exemptions to generally applicable policies.14 At other times, they
simply infer such authority from their greater statutory power to
enforce generally applicable norms. In either case, agencies possess
the potential to distribute exemptions in a discriminatory fashion,
singling out religion-or worse, only mainstream religions-for
advantageous or disadvantageous treatment.
The problem of administrative discretion is not unique to
permissive accommodation. It exists whenever agencies distribute
scarce governmental benefits. Nor is the problem of administrative
discretion and discrimination-either for or against religion-unique
to permissive accommodation. Agencies may engage in religious
discrimination when selecting organizations to receive grants
pursuant to a facially neutral social services program." Agencies
also may engage in religious discrimination when awarding licenses
for building expansions or awarding permits for meeting places.'42
The potential for religious discrimination occurs in these contexts
as well as in the exemption context for a variety of reasons. First,
agencies commonly award benefits and exemptions under vague
statutory standards like "in the public interest" or "for good cause,"
or without any statutory standards at all. In the absence of concrete
standards, agencies lack direction and limitation concerning the
particular attributes that trigger a benefit or exemption and the
permissible range of reasons for denying a benefit or exemption. In
short, there is little to constrain agencies from exercising their
resources available to support accommodations.
140. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
141. Cf Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,608 (1988) (allowing for the possibility of an as-
applied challenge to a government-funded adolescent sexuality program that included
religious organizations among its participants).
142. Members of Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 partly in response to claims of discrimination against religion in the adoption or
implementation of land use regulations. Pub. L. 106-274, § 2(a), 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114
Stat.) 803 (forbidding government from imposing land use regulations in a manner that
substantially burdens religious exercise in the absence of a compelling interest).
As was seen during congressional hearings in both the House and Senate, land
use regulations, either by design or neutral application, often prevent religious
assemblies and institutions from obtaining access to a plae of worship .... The
land use section ofthe bill prohibits discrimination against religious assemblies
and institutions, and prohibits the total exclusion of religious assemblies from
a jurisdiction.
106 CONG. RFc. S6687-88 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
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discretion in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion. Second,
agencies typically make benefit and exemption decisions on an ad
hoc or case-by-case basis, which creates opportunities for disparate
treatment across claimants. Third, agencies often make benefit and
exemption decisions with less accountability than legislatures and
less visibility than courts.'4
While little can be done to alter the essential nature of
administrative decision making, something can be done to
compensate for the lack of standards that frequently attends it. In
particular, agencies can be required to supply standards guiding
their benefit and exemption decisions. Standards, generally im-
portant in administrative law for limiting the exercise of agency
discretion, seem particularly important under the Establishment
Clause with respect to individualized decisions that risk discrim-
ination among religions and between religion and nonreligion.
Furthermore, some courts have mandated administrative standards
under the Due Process Clause in analogous cases involving
administrative distribution of scarce governmental benefits.'
Thus, there is an argument that either the Establishment Clause
or the Due Process Clause, or both, obligate agencies to step in and
promulgate their own standards when they receive benefit or
exemption authority without statutory standards narrowing their
discretion. In any event, providing administrative standards under
these circumstances is a constitutionally prudent course because it
promotes consistent, fair, and accountable administrative decisions.
To adequately confine administrative discretion with respect
to exemptions, administrative standards must contain at least
two components. First, they must define the general qualifications
for the exemption. They might list a specific class of eligible ben-
eficiaries or specify the functional category that triggers the
exemption. Second, the standards must describe the range of
143. See Lupu, The Trouble withAccommodation, supra note 24, at 778 ("Administrative
accommodations are typically ad hoc and less visible [than legislative accommodations], and
thus tend to suffer even more from the likelihood of invidious ... discrimination.").
144. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232-36 (1974) (holding that the BIA failed to
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act by not publishing its general assistance
eligibility requirments); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir.
1968) (holding that due process requires an agency to use "ascertainable standards");
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that due process
requirements apply to licensing).
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reasons available to the agency for denying individual exemptions.
Such reasons might include unusual burdens imposed on third
parties or extraordinary financial or administrative costs imposed
on the agency. To ensure their validity and visibility, the reasons
and the eligibility qualifications must be well defended and
documented. To ensure their effectiveness, they must be capable of
binding the agency in future cases (until officially changed).
Although administrative standards will reduce the potential
for discrimination, they will not completely eliminate it.
Administrators still will possess the ability to discriminate, for
example, in determining whether an individual claimant satisfies
the eligibility criteria. Certain procedures, however, already exist
to prevent or remedy instances of discrimination. Agencies must
consider all claims for equal treatment, and their denials are
subject to review, as Justice Souter noted in Kiryas Joel.14 In
addition, agencies typicallymust issue explanations for their denial
decisions in one format or another. Nevertheless, these procedures
cannot entirely restrict the discretion-and the potential for
discrimination-inevitable in any system of individualized exemp-
tions, particularly one involving disputed categories like "religion"
and "comparable to religion." The hope is that these procedures,
combined with the additional requirement of administrative
standards, will minimize that amount and that potential to the
greatest extent possible.
CONCLUSION
The legislative impulse to accommodate religious liberty is both
noble and necessary. It is noble for legislatures to show solicitude
for the religious values of its citizens by exempting certain citizens
from the burdens of generally applicable laws. Furthermore, it is
necessary, in light of Smith, for legislatures to do so through the
political process rather than by simply relying on courts to award
individual exemptions as of right under the Free Exercise Clause.
In any event, the political process always has afforded legislatures
more discretion to accommodate religious liberty than the judicial
process has afforded courts.
145. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994).
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The legislative impulse to accommodate religious liberty is not an
unmitigated good, however, when it extends no further than
religion (or only mainstream religions). Minimizing governmental
interference only with respect to religion amounts to preference for
religion over nonreligion. When accomplished through an act of
ordinary politics, such preference violates the principle of equal
treatment underlying the Establishment Clause. Thus, permissive
accommodation presents a paradox-it contains the seeds of
benevolence toward some and discrimination toward others.
The equal liberty approach provides a solution to this paradox. It
supports benevolence toward religion by permitting legislatures to
grant the requests of religious claimants. But it thwarts
discrimination between religion and nonreligion and among
religions by requiring legislatures to show a willingness to extend
protection to similarly situated nonreligious, and religious,
claimants. It asks legislatures to demonstrate that willingness on
the face of the statute conferring the exemption-by creating a
beneficiary class that includes both religion and nonreligion or
writing a religion-neutral accommodation policy-because the
political process simply provides no other assurance of equal
treatment.
The difficulty for the equal liberty approach comes in determining
the appropriate nonreligious class or functional equivalent. This
determination requires legislatures to confront some of the most
perplexing questions in religion law: Why do we protect religious
liberty and which nonreligious values deserve comparable
protection? It also calls on courts to evaluate the answers without
a definitive standard for assessing equality between religion and
nonreligion. Religion and nonreligion might be similar or different
in any number of ways. The relevant comparison requires an
underlying substantive judgment about the public purpose
underlying particular legislative acts, as well as the nature of
religion and comparable secular values in particular cases.
The most important issue is whether legislatures or courts should
make that judgment in the first instance-that is, whether courts
should respect legislative accommodation judgments or supply
independent judgments of their own. Because of the undeniable
policy discretion involved, the equal liberty approach directs courts
to defer to legislatures in selecting a rationale for protecting
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religious liberty and in adapting that rationale to nonreligious
liberty in particular cases. At the same time, it recognizes that
deference is inadequate to prevent instances of religious favoritism,
which might occur, for example, if an accommodation contained
an unreasonably narrow nonreligious beneficiary class or an
eligibility condition that fenced out all but religious or only some
religious beneficiaries. The equal liberty approach instructs courts
to examine permissive accommodations to ensure that they gen-
uinely reflect equality but in a minimally intrusive fashion. It
instructs courts to uphold permissive accommodations if ac-
companied by legislative reasons justifying the scope of the
accommodation in equality terms.
The equal liberty approach stakes no claim to the perfect solution
from either a religious liberty standpoint or an equality standpoint.
It will provide insufficient protection for religious liberty if it makes
legislative exemptions too complex or expensive. It will provide
insufficient protection for equality among religions if it makes
exemptions only available to, and at the behest of, politically
popular religions. But no one said it would be easy, at least no one
who squarely confronts the paradoxical nature of permissive
accommodation. The equal liberty approach furnishes a better
solution, enabling legislatures affirmatively to protect religious
liberty while providing a measure of equality.
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